In this article, Lucas maintains the falseness of Mechanism - the attempt to explain minds as machines - by means of Incompleteness Theorem of Gödel. Gödel’s theorem shows that in any system consistent and adequate for simple arithmetic there are formulae which cannot be proved in the system but that human minds can recognize as true; Lucas points out in his turn that Gödel’s theorem applies to machines because a machine is the concrete instantiation of a formal system: therefore, for (...) every machine consistent and able of doing simple arithmetic, there is a formula that it can’t produce as true but that we can see to be true, and so human minds and machines have to be different. Lucas considers as well in this article some possible objections to his argument: for any Gödelian formula we could, for instance, construct a machine able to produce it or we could put the Gödelian formulae that we had proved as axioms of a further machine. However - as Lucas underlines - for every of such machines we could again formulate another Gödelian formula, the Gödelian formula of these machines, that they are not able to proof but that we can recognize as true. More general arguments, such as the possibility to escape Gödelian argument by suggesting that Gödel’s theorem applies to consistent systems while we could be inconsistent ones, are moreover refuted by Lucas by maintaining that our inconsistency corresponds to occasional malfunctioning of a machine and not to his normal inconsistency; indeed, a inconsistent machine is characterized by producing any statement, on the contrary human being are selective and not disposed to assert anything. (shrink)

If beliefs are a map by which we steer, then, ceteris paribus, we should want a more accurate map. However, the world could be structured so as to punish learning with respect to certain topics—by learning new information, one’s situation could be worse than it otherwise would have been. We investigate whether the world is structured so as to punish learning specifically about moral nihilism. We ask, if an ordinary person had the option to learn the truth about moral nihilism, (...) ought she to take it? We argue, given plausible assumptions about ordinary human preferences, she should not. (shrink)

This paper begins with a puzzle regarding Lewis' theory of radical interpretation. On the one hand, Lewis convincingly argued that the facts about an agent's sensory evidence and choices will always underdetermine the facts about her beliefs and desires. On the other hand, we have several representation theorems—such as those of (Ramsey 1931) and (Savage 1954)—that are widely taken to show that if an agent's choices satisfy certain constraints, then those choices can suffice to determine her beliefs and desires. In (...) this paper, I will argue that Lewis' conclusion is correct: choices radically underdetermine beliefs and desires, and representation theorems provide us with no good reasons to think otherwise. Any tension with those theorems is merely apparent, and relates ultimately to the difference between how 'choices' are understood within Lewis' theory and the problematic way that they're represented in the context of the representation theorems. For the purposes of radical interpretation, representation theorems like Ramsey's and Savage's just aren't very relevant after all. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on the limits of narrative by asking what kinds of things narratives do, and what kinds of texts do related things in other ways. In particular I focus on how narrative genres organise time in relation to value, drawing on functional linguistic models of temporality and evaluation. From a linguistic perspective, the various narrative genres negotiate different kinds of solidarity with listeners, and so the limits of narrative materialise various possibilities for communing in a culture, (...) alongside the potentialities for construing community through related and other genres of discourse—since in general, the limits/possibilities of our language (and attendant modalities of communication) are the limits/possibilities of our social world. (shrink)

Este libro es un ensayo filosófico que expresa la relevancia que para John Stuart Mill tiene la educación, hasta el punto de considerarla como un derecho fundamental de las personas, teniendo en cuenta que en su tiempo no existían los hoy conocidos Derechos Humanos. Stuart Mill se adelanta a nuestra época y presenta a la educación como ese derecho básico de toda persona que ha de ser protegido, potenciado y proporcionado por los diversos Estados.

L'âpreté des débats qui eurent lieu, notamment en Cappadoce entre 360 et 378, en pleine crise arienne, autour de la nature et de la personne du Saint-Esprit, ainsi que la diversité des opinions à l'intérieur même des camps opposés sur cette question, rendent délicate l'identification exacte des adversaires combattus par Basile de Césarée en 375 dans son traité Sur le Saint-Esprit, l'un des premiers du genre, d'autant plus que lui-même trouva des contradicteurs dans les rangs de ses propres amis. Dédié (...) à son disciple Amphiloque d'Iconium, le traité vise essentiellement, au-delà d'Aèce, son compatriote Eunome, toujours vivant et virulent, que Basile avait déjà combattu vers 360-363, le théoricien arien radical de la « dissemblance » et de la « subordination » de l'Esprit au Fils et au Père, manifestement visé ici par le vocabulaire de la « connumération » et de la « coordination ». La critique contemporaine avait pensé que le principal adversaire de Basile serait son ancien maître en ascétisme Eustathe évêque de Sébaste, qui tenait sur l'Esprit une doctrine ambiguë, ne voulant le ranger « ni avec Dieu ni avec les créatures ». Sans l'exclure du nombre des adversaires, le vocabulaire et l'argumentation du traité, sans rapport avec ceux de la Lettre 125 de Basile à Eustathe, obligent à abandonner cette interprétation pour rendre la priorité à Eunome. The acrimonious debates that took place concerning the nature and person of the Holy Spirit, especialy during the Arian crisis in Cappadocia from 360 to 378, as well as the diversity of opinions within the opposing camps, makes it difficult to identify the adversaries of Basil of Caesarea in his treatise On the Holy Spirit , unique for his time. The problem is even greater because Basil found himself at odds with his own friends. Dedicated to his disciple Amphilocus of Iconium, the treatise was aimed, essentially, beyond Aëtios, at his virulent compatriot Eunomius. Basil had already engaged him around 360-363. A radical Arian theoretician of the “dissemblance” and of “subordination” of the Spirit to the Son and Father, Eunomius was clearly targeted by the vocabulary of the “connumeration” and “coordination”. Contemporary criticism thought that the principal adversary of Basil could have been his old master in asceticism, Eustathius , who held an ambiguous doctrine about the Spirit, not wishing to place it “either with God or with creatures”. Without excluding him from the number of adversaries, the vocabulary and argumentation of the treatise, which are unconnected to those of Basil's Letter 125 to Eustathius, oblige us to abandon this interpretation and give priority to Eunomius. (shrink)

This difficult and intensely sophisticated work is probably the most comprehensive and profound introduction to Hegel available in English. It has several aspects. Polemically, Rosen argues that Hegel must be read primarily as a logician, "... not as a philosopher of history, a political thinker, a theologian, or a Lebensphilosoph." He definitely does not mean that Hegel was interested in the analysis of logical structures, sentences, or axioms for their own sake. Rather, Hegel’s task was a reflection upon the presuppositions, (...) potentialities, and limitations of logic and analysis themselves, and to describe their final inability to give a logos, or to complete a discursive account of the totality of experience which philosophers since Plato have called the Whole. Rosen shows that approaching Hegel as, say, a philosopher of history leads inescapably to facing Hegel as a metaphysician, or, that is, as a logician. (shrink)

The occasion for this collection of four essays—by Vlastos, Ostwald, Callahan, and Solmsen—was Plato’s 2400th birthday in 1974. We note at once the book’s most disappointing and inexplicable flaw: it includes no example of North’s own fine classical scholarship and luminous understanding of the spirit of Platonic thought. Ostwald’s essay, ranging over much of the Platonic corpus, tills the well-plowed field of Plato’s contribution to the nomos-physis problem. His thesis is clear and familiar: Plato introduces new objects, eide, into nature, (...) the knowledge of which objects founds both the techne [[sic]] of the true king and justice. The science of such knowledge is the bulwark against Thrasymachus’s, Callicles', and Glaucon’s arguments concerning ‘natural law'. Ostwald seems unwilling, though, to grapple with the practical details of this techne [[sic]] in the political sphere. Rep. 546b-e and Polit. 310d ff. are programmatic, not substantive, and supply more puzzlement than answer. Callahan takes no smaller a topic than dialectic, myth, and history in Plato. His most interesting claim is that myth provides a setting for dialectic; each dialogue, he argues, is itself a myth, providing a locus wherein mythical topics, historical personages, and records of dialectical examinations can themselves be examined. Solmsen’s quite suggestive essay asks why Plato should investigate the physical world, which is intrinsically less than fully knowable, as well as being an insufficient source of guidance for man on issues of justice, moderation, and conduct. Though pointing out that physical bodies and their science must be of lesser rank than dialectic, Solmsen reminds us that not only did bodies provide a starting-point for mathematical demonstrations, and the incentive for solid geometry, but also that the planetary motions provided a taxis, an order, which was an image of an ordered cosmos, itself an image of an ordered eidetic realm. (shrink)

With this book Professor Weingartner has added to that portion of Plato-interpretation which attempts to illuminate the fact that "Plato wrote dialogues." His central claims are two: 1) Plato’s argumentation cannot be understood outside the dialogue form within which Plato himself never appears; and 2) the unity which suffuses each of the dialogues can render potent the argumentation which would be otherwise either inaccurate or inadequate. Correlative to these theses, he argues, perhaps too briefly, against those who would try to (...) ignore the dialogue genre altogether. For such interpreters, Weingartner’s argument goes, "... questions and objections that are interjected by the other participants in the conversation... are seen as mere literary devices which provide Plato’s prolocutor with plausible opportunities for stating and clarifying his own views." On the other hand, he criticizes those who would make of Plato nothing but a literary figure, and of Socrates a "god of refutation." Fittingly, though, Professor Weingartner also clarifies the more subtle mistake of reading the dialogues "... as tranches de vie philosophique, in which the character of Socrates plays the leading role...". Having stated what he takes to be improper interpretive devices, he selects the Cratylus, Protagoras, and Parmenides and "... attempts to show, in some detail, that each of them can, and therefore should, be understood as a unified whole.". (shrink)

XLRI, in association with a few Tata Group companies, established the XLRI-JRD Tata Foundation in Business Ethics in 1991 to mark their long-standing commitment and contribution to business ethics in India. The foundation seeks to address this by publicly affirming the urgent need for ethics in business and the need to bring about a conducive culture in which it can thrive.

“Towards a Theory of Taxation” is a proper theme for an Englishman to take when giving a paper in America. After all it was from the absence of such a theory that the United States derived its existence. The Colonists felt strongly that there should be no taxation without representation, and George III was unable to explain to them convincingly why they should contribute to the cost of their defense. Since that time, understanding has not advanced much. In Britain we (...) still maintain the fiction that taxes are a voluntary gift to the Crown, and taxing statutes are given the Royal Assent with the special formula, “La Reine remercie ses bons sujets, accepte leur benevolence, et ainsi le veult” instead of the simple “La Reine le veult,” and in the United States taxes have regularly been levied on residents of the District of Columbia who until recently had no representation in Congress, and by the State of New York on those who worked but did not reside in the State, and so did not have a vote. Taxes are regularly levied, in America as elsewhere, on those who have no say on whether they should be levied or how they should be spent. I am taxed by the Federal Government on my American earnings and by state governments on my American spending, but I should be hard put to it to make out that it was unjust. Florida is wondering whether to follow California in taxing multinational corporations on their world-wide earnings. (shrink)

The stock of natural law has risen in recent years. It is partly due to growing dissatisfaction with the elucidations offered by the legal positivists, and partly because sceptical arguments have lost their edge. In the heyday of logical positivism it was easy to say ``I don't understand what you mean by `right' . . .'' and break off discussion without more ado; but, as the bounds of unintelligibility increased and came to encompass almost the whole of human knowledge, an (...) inability to understand became not so much a boast as a confession. Many people may still be unclear about the metaphysical foundations of the moral sciences; but we are disinclined to doubt that they are serious disciplines, or to think that they need to be, or even could be, reconstructed without any moral element. Moreover, the events of this century have begun to penetrate the academic consciousness. Having witnessed the terrible tyrannies of the Nazis, the Communists and the Third World, we find it difficult to divorce our thinking about law from our thinking about morals. Although 'duty' is still an unfashionable word, people are constantly talking about the rights that are being denied them and the wrongs being inflicted on them. And these rights claimed and wrongs resented are grounded not on some existing legal enactment or a one-time social contract, but on the nature of man and the nature of the state, and are therefore, although very different from their mediaeval articulation, arguments of natural law. (shrink)

This paper considers prevailing environmental policy in the United States with the emphasis on liberty, markets, utilizing information, entrepreneurial discovery, and the economic analysis of political decisions. The general discussion is illustrated by the concern over global warming and policies for addressing this concern. The political incentives to confront environmental problems directly with mandates, restrictions, and subsidies ignore the power of liberty and market incentives to solve problems by fostering an impressive network of information transfer, increasing innovation, and expanding prosperity. (...) Indeed, most environmental policies systematically suppress liberty, censor the communication of information, and retard innovation and prosperity, with the result that they provide less environmental quality at greater cost than is possible. While such flawed policies might be justified in cases where pollution problems pose clear, serious, and immediate threats, we argue this is not true of global warming, and the most effective response to concerns over carbon emissions may be limiting the discretionary power of government to take direct action and rely on the indirect effects of liberty and market incentives to move us beyond the petroleum age more quickly and efficiently than will result from the direct action of government. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)